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FORWARD: 
This document is being submitted as a final technical report for research conducted 
under NASA Cooperative Agreement NCC 2-706 through the SET1 Institute from 
January 1, 1991 to April 30, 1995. However, for reasons described below, the 
document represents more of an administrative final report than an actual final 
technical report for the research in question. 
Based on recommendations of NASA internal reviewers in winter 1994-95, it was 
determined that this research project would more appropriately be categorized as a 
grant rather than a cooperative agreement. Accordingly, a changeover was made in 
1995, terminating the cooperative agreement and initiating a new research grant 
under which the research would continue. The research accomplished under 
Cooperative Agreement NCC 2-706 actually took place in several distinct phases as 
follows : 
January 1,1991 to December 31,1993: 
Original 3-year research proposal renewed in Years 02 & 03. 
January 1,1994 to December 31,1994: 
3-year Continuation Proposal - approved for Year 01 only. 
January 1,1995 to April 30,1995.: 
No cost extension to cooperative agreement 
May 1, 1995 onward: Starting date for new research grant. 
While the cooperative agreement was formally terminated as of April 30, 1995, much 
of the research has continued as originally planned. Since May 1, 1995, the research 
work has continued under NASA Research Grant Number NAS 2-986 through the 
SET1 Institute and NASA Ames Research Center. 
FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT 
FOR NASA COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT NCC 2-706 
INTEGRATION OF PLANETARY PROTECTION ACTIVITIES 
by 
Dr. Margaret S. Race 
Principal Investigator 
BACKGROUND: 
For decades, NASA has been concerned about the protection of planets and other 
solar system bodies from biological contamination. Its policies regarding biological 
contamination control for outbound and inbound planetary spacecraft have evolved to 
focus on three important areas: 1) the preservation of celestial objects and the space 
environment, 2) protection of Earth from extraterrestrial hazards, and 3) ensuring the 
integrity of its scientific investigations. Over the years as new information has been 
obtained from planetary exploration and research, planetary protection parameters 
and policies have been modified accordingly. The overall focus of research under this 
cooperative agreement has been to provide information about non-scientific and 
societal factors related to planetary protection and use it in the planning and 
implementation phases of future Mars sample return missions. 
In the face of its proposed series of missions to Mars, and in light of continued 
scientific interest in the possible existence of life on Mars, NASA has recognized the 
need to intensify its focus on planetary protection (PP) activities and requirements. It is 
apparent that planetary protection must include more than just scientific and technical 
aspects of the mission. It is generally acknowledged that before an official set of 
requirements can be established for a sample return mission, a variety of technical, 
legal and political issues and public concerns must be evaluated. Included among 
these are (1) evaluation of public concerns about returning samples from Mars into 
Earth's environment; (2) legal considerations and responsibilities of regulatory 
agencies: (3) analysis of the likelihood of an indigenous biota on Mars; (4) effect of 
Martian oxidants on terrestrial life: (5) technology for aseptic transfer of sample 
canister to Earth return vehicles; (6) technology for exterior sterilization of sample 
return vehicle; and (7) sample sealing and preservation technology to prevent 
movement of material in either direction. Because contamination control procedures 
can complicate mission design, are technologically challenging, and can have 
substantial impact on mission costs, answers to these and other planetary protection 
questions are needed in the near future for incorporation into all aspects of mission 
planning . 
, 
PROGRESS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS: 1991 -93. 
The research conducted under this cooperative agreement sought answers to 
questions about planetary protection for future Mars exploration missions focusing on 
both forward and back contamination concerns. Like most projects, the objectives of 
the multi-year research evolved over time. Initially the objectives were stated in 
general terms because little information was available to judge the importance of 
societal and non-scientific factors as planetary protection concerns on future Mars 
missions. The general objectives for the first three years (1 991 -93) of the project were 
twofold: 
1) to identify and analyze the efforts needed to inform, enlist and deal with the many 
audiences, clientele and public groups likely to require information on planetary 
protection prior to, during and after future Mars missions, and 
2) to develop a comprehensive planning framework that could be used to manage and 
oversee PP activities and information flow associated with Mars missions. 
The first year's work emphasized the gathering and analysis of information about 
NASA's planetary protection activities, both past and present, to determine the 
implications for proposed Mars missions, both with and without sample return. The 
work began with a comprehensive literature review on planetary protection and 
related topics (legal, historical, scientific, policy, risk communication, 
technicaVengineering, management and institutional) in order to identify and evaluate 
key planetary protection issues and questions needing further research or attention by 
NASA. 
The second and third years of research sought to gain a detailed understanding of 
societal and non-scientific factors representing potentially significant impediments for 
future Mars missions, and the relative importance of these factors on forward vs. back 
contamination concerns. The research also focused on understanding the nature of 
the external environment and public decision making arena likely to face future Mars 
sample return missions- A detailed comparison was made between sample return 
missions and scientific controversies involving public decision making in order to 
identify and more fully understand key areas or issues that may need special attention. 
The ultimate goal of the 1991 -93 research was to develop for NASA a comprehensive 
plan for planetary protection activities that would help guide the generation and flow of 
information required by various clientele groups and audiences. The work was driven 
by the belief that NASA must be selectively proactive in its handling of planetary 
protection research and concerns if it hopes to minimize disruption or delay to future 
Mars exploration missions, especially those involving sample returns to Earth. 
During the period of the 1991 -93 cooperative agreement, numerous presentations 
were made to NASA and the space community, to university academics, and to the 
general public, including: 
Workshop on Planetary Protection Issues for the MESUR Mission: Probability of 
Growth (Pg), Palo Alto, CA, June 1991 
National Academy of Sciences, Space Studies Board, Planetary Protection 
Workshop, Iwine, CA, September,l991 
Energy and Resource Graduate Group Seminar Series, University of California 
at Berkeley, April 1992 
Joint US/Russia Workshop on Planetary Protection Implementation for Future 
Mars Lander Missions,Palo Alto CA, July 1992 
University of California Alumni Association, Invited Speaker, August, 1992 
World Space Congress/COSPAR, Washington D.C.,September, 1992 
University of California Alumni Association, Invited Speaker, Los Angeles, 
March 1993 
NASA Ames Research Center, Space Science Division Seminar Series, April 
1993 
Two papers were written and submitted for publication during the 1991-93 grant 
period. jiisted beiow with their ultimate publication dates and citation information): 
Race, M.S. Mars Sample Return and Biohazards: A Source of Public Concern 
and Controversy. In Case for Mars V, edited by P. Boston, American 
Astronautical Society, Univelt Press, San Diego. (currently in press--- 
anticipated publication date: 1996) 
Race, M.S. Societal Issues as Mars Mission ImDediments: Planetarv Protection 
and Contamination Concerns. Adv. in Space Research, vol. 15 (3):’pp 285-292, 
1995. 
PROGRESS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS: 1994-95 
? Based on insight gained in the first phase of this research, refinements in research 
emphasis were made to focus subsequently on four particular non-scientific and 
societal areas because of their importance to future mission planning and concerns 
about critical timing or possible economic impacts on mission implementation. The 
priority areas identified in the 1994-96 continuation proposal included: 
1) questions of legal uncertainty and the decision making process, 
2) public perception of risks associated with sample return, 
3) planetary protection implications of alternative mission architectures-- both 
robotic and human sample return missions, and 
4) risk communication via the mass media. 
Because of the early termination of the cooperative agreement to change to grant 
status, only 1.3 years of work were accomplished towards these objectives (through 
April 30,1995). As mentioned above, work continues to the present on these 
objectives under NASA Research Grant # NAS 2-986. 
During 1994-95 under this cooperative agreement, research was conducted on the 
following three areas: 
1. Legal Uncertainty and Decision Making Process 
Conducted a survey of domestic laws and regulations as well as international 
treaties to determine their applicability to various sample return proposals and 
their likelihood of presenting problems for the decision making process and 
implementation of mission plans. 
Outlined the entire decision making process associated with sample return 
missions, identifying clientele groups needing information at different times, key 
perspectives and interests represented by various groups, and probable 
situations or issues in which concerns about risks could prompt legal 
challenges, public opposition or intense media focus. This phase included an 
assessment of intra-NASA and organizational issues that could impact the 
decision making process leading to Mars sample return missions. 
2. Risk Perception 
Began theoretical development and conceptual work to investigate the 
public's understanding and perceptions about the risks of sample return in 
order to provide information ultimately needed for planning, preparation, and 
delivery of a comprehensive risk communication program for Mars missions. 
3. Mission Architecture : 
Began analysis of proposed mission architectures for both robotic and human 
sample return missions to assess strengths and weakness from legal, 
management, social and operational perspectives as they relate to planetary 
protection concerns. Special emphasis was focused on potentially problematic 
steps or situations arising from planetary protection concerns that could impact 
mission success such as environmental impact statement requirements, 
operations of quarantine facilities and methods of transporting samples after 
arrival on Earth. 
The goal of this second phase of the research was to assist NASA in eventually 
formulating an effective risk communication strategy that is responsive to specific 
informational needs of various clientele and audience groups and that effectively 
anticipates potential opposition and challenges to sample return missions based on 
planetary protection concerns. 
During the period of the 1994-95 cooperative agreement, formal presentations on 
research progress were made at various conferences and meetings including: 
Conference on the Media and Environmental Risk. Association for Education in 
Journalism and Mass Communication. Reno, Nevada. April 1994. 
. I . . *  . ., .. . .  
- 
Fifth Exobiology Symposium and Mars Workshop, NASA Ames Research 
Center, April, 1994. 
Invited Workshop on Invasion Biology, Genetic Resources Conservation 
Program, UC Davis, May 1994. 
Mars Exobiology Strategy Workshop, NASA Ames Research Center, July 1994. 
30th COSPAR Scientific Assembly, Planetary Protection for Solar System 
Exploration. Hamburg, Germany, July 1994. 
One paper was written and published during the 1994-95 period: 
Race, M.S. Anticipating the Reaction: Public Concern About Sample Return 
Missions. Planetary Report, Volume XIV(4) pp.20-22. July/August 1994. 
In addition, extensive technical assistance about planetary protection and Mars 
missions was provided to subcontractor Dr. Paul Slovic, who was collaborating under 
this cooperative agreement on research related to risk perceptions about sample 
return. This collaboration led to two additional publications under this cooperative 
agreement during 1994-95: 
MacGregor D.G., and P.Slovic. Planetary Exploration Survey. Planetary 
Report, Volume XIV(4) pp.20 (2 page insert). July/August 1994. 
MacGregor D.G., and P.Slovic. The Planetary Exploration Survey: What 
Society Members Think About Planetary Protection. Planetary Report, Volume 
XV(2) pp.4-6, March/April 1995. 
Ultimately, this line of research on risk perception will be helpful in assessing how the 
public perceives sample return, providing information that will help evaluate the 
effectiveness of different risk communication strategies for various audiences. In 
addition, the results will be helpful in anticipating social concerns and possible legal 
challenges based on public concerns about sample return. 
APPEND ICES : 
A. BUDGETS: 
During the span of this cooperative agreement, annual budgets were as follows: 
Year 01 January 1,1991 - December 31,1991. $ 67,000 
Year 02 $ 59,767 
Year 03 $ 63,356 
No cost Extension 
January 1 , 1992 - December 31,1992 
January 1 , 1993 - December 31,1993 
January 1,1995 - April 30,1995 
Year 04 January 1,1994 - December 31,1994 70,384 
TOTAL COSTS: $260,507 
B. PUBLICATIONS AND ABSTRACTS 
P u bii cat i o ns : 
M.S. Race. Mars Sample Retum and Biohazards: A Source of Public Concern 
and Controversy. In Case for Mars V, edited by P. Boston, American 
Astronautical Society, Univelt Press, San Diego. (currently in press--- 
anticipated publication date: 1996) 
M.S. Race. Societal Issues as Mars Mission Impediments: Planetary Protection 
and Contamination Concerns. Adv. in Space Research, vol. 15 (3): pp 285-292, 
1995. 
MS. Race. Anticipating the Reaction: Public Concern About Sample Retum 
Missions. Planetary Report, Volume XIV(4) pp.20-22. July/August 1994. 
D.G. MacGregor and P.Slovic. Planetary Exploration Survey. Planetary Report, 
Volume XIV(4) pp.20 (2 page insert). JulylAugust 1994. 
D.G. MacGregor and P.Slovic. The Planetary Exploration Survey: What Society 
Members Think About Planetary Protection. Planetary Report, Volume XV(2) 
pp.4-6, March/April 1995. 
Abstracts: 
M.S. Race. Societal Issues as Mission Impediments: Planetary Protection and 
Contamination Concerns. The World Space Congress/COSPAR, Washington 
D.C., 1992. 
M.S. Race. Implications of Legal Uncertainties, Public Perceptions and the 
Decision Making Process for Mars Sample Return Missions. fifth Exobiology 
Symposium and Mars Workshop, NASA Ames Research Center, 1994. 
M.S. Race. Planetary Protection, Legal Uncertainty and the Decision Making Process fo 
Mars Sample Return. 30th COSPAR Scientific Assembly, Hamburg, Germany, 1994. 
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MARS SAMPLE RETURN AND BIOHAZARDS: 
A Source of Public Concern and Controversy 
Margaret S. Race' 
Societal concerns about environment, health, and safety 
are likely to complicate planning for future Mars missions, 
especially those involving sample returns. Unless planners 
and engineers seriously consider "biohazard" and 
"planetary protection" concerns during the earliest mission 
pianning stages, it's possible that public opposition, cost 
increases and missed launch windows will interfere with 
mission success. Using lessons learned from genetic 
engineering and past environmental controversies, it's 
possible to understand and anticipate how social and non- 
scientific factors could adversely impact future missions to 
Mars. In the face of important social trends of the past two 
decades and the public's growing aversion to perceived 
risks and biohazards, NASA should adopt a strategy that 
actively plans both the generation and subsequent 
management of planetary protection information to ensure 
that key audiences obtain needed information at 
appropriate pre-launch times. 
INTRODUCTION 
Mars is a prime target in the continuing exploration of the solar system for 
clues concerning the origin, evolution and distribution of life and life-related 
molecules.' Much of the interest and focus of Mars ssions has been centered 
As saentists plan future missions, they currently entertain three alternative 
views about life on Mars. Most sdentists familiar with Viking results believe that 
the existence of life on present-day Mars is improbable anywhere on the planet, 
although it cannot be ruled out with certainty. Some scientists believe them is a 
remote possibility that if a living system did'arise on Mars during its more benign 
past, it may have been able to adapt to deteriorating conditions as the planet 
lost most of its atmosphere, cooled down and dried out-- and that living 
organisms may still be present on Mars in suitable, as yet unidentified niches. 
around the search for life and the eventual return of 2 mples from the planet- 
College of Natural Resources. 101 Giannini Hall, University of California. * 
Berkeley CA 94720 U.S.A. 
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Finally, some suggest that if life evolved on Mars but died out as the planet 
deteriorated, it may be possible to detect these anaent extinct organisms in 
future sampling. Because it is impossible to determine with certainty which of 
these views accurately reflects the situation on Mars, both the space community 
and the genera1 public are likely to remain interested in the outcome of future 
Mars exploration and the search for life.2 Accordingly, it is imperative that 
.- mission planning efforts seriously address concerns about planetary protecb'on 
and biohazards to prevent harmful cross-contamination of planets during space 
exploration. 
Concerns about planetary protection and biohazards are hardly new. 
NASA has taken planetary protection concerns seriously for decades, with its 
zttention focused largely on hardware and technical aspects of planetary 
protection controls3 NASA's current planetary protection policy (NMI 8020.76, 
December 12, 1991) requires: 
T i e  conduct of scientific investigation of possible extraterrestrial life 
forms, precursors, and remnants must not be jeopardized. In addition, 
the Earth must be protected from the potential hazard posed by 
extraterrestrial matter carried by a spacecraft returning from another 
planet. Therefore, for certain space- m issionltarg et- planet com bi nations, 
controls on organic and biological contamination carried by spacecraft 
shall be imposed ..." 
In planning for future missions there is a need to recognize that a variety 
of social and non-scientific factors also have important implications for planetary 
protection. Over the past two decades, social and non-scientific issues have 
played increasingly important roles in the outcome of conflicts over 
technological decisions and actions involving government agencies, industry, 
and the public. Because the decision to return a sample from Mars has 
environmental, health and safety concerns, it will be subject to intense scrutiny 
by both by the space community and the general public, with much of the 
debate occurring in the public realm. To prepare for this scrutiny, those 
involved with Mars missions must be aware of how social and non-saentific 
factors relate to planetary protection. By drawing on lessons learned from 
genetic engineering and past environmental controversies, it is possible to 
anticipate how social and non-scientific issues could adversely impact future 
Mars sample return missions. As a generalization, delay or avoidance in 
dealing with these social and non-scientific issues early in mission planning will 
greatly increase the likelihood of public opposition, cost increases and missed 
launch windows for future Mars sample return missions. 
PLANETARY PROTECTION 
In practical terms, concerns about planetary protection focus on two key 
areas: forward contamination, the introduction onto a planetary body of 
terrestrial microbes carried on outbound spacecraft or equipment: and back 
cuntamination, the introduction onto Earth of contamination or life forms carried 
in return soils or samples. Two distinct perspectives underlie concerns about 
contamination: one emphasizing pmtection of the planets based on concerns 
about ecological principles and publidplanetary health, and the other 
emphasizing protection of experiments based on concerns about the conduct 
of scientific investigations and mission success. For forward contamination, the 
two perspectives translate into concerns about (1) the potential for growth of 
terrestrial organisms on Mars and (2) the importation of terrestrial organic 
contaminants, living or dead, in amounts suffiaent to compromise the search for 
evidence of past or present life on Mars itseK2 For back contamination, the 
concerns are (1) the potential for survival and growth of martian organisms on 
Earth, and (2) unintentional contamination of martian samples with earth 
organisms in ways that might cornpmmise scientific their interpretaticn. 
Protection of planets is of interest to both the space community and the 
general public, and is backed by explicit and implicit legal requirements that 
international laws governing environment, health and safety). In contrast, 
protection of scientific experiments is of interest mainly to space scientists and 
managers, and is backed by legally non-enforceable management directives 
and policies promulgated by space agencies. Over the years, planetary 
protection requirements used by NASA have aimed to satisfy both perspecbves 
simultaneously, despite the possibility that implementation for one may or may 
not completely satisfy the other. Both perspectives cleariy have implications for 
Mars missions, although protection of planets, especially Earth, is likely to carry 
more weight in mission planning and implementation because of public 
concerns. 
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PAST EXPERIENCES WITH PLANETARY CONTROL 
Forward Contamination 
Over the years, discussions about forward contamination controls for 
Mars missions have focused on the extremely low probability of growth of 
terrestrial organisms in the harsh martian environment and the question of 
whether Viking-like controls would be unnecessarily stringent and costly to 
future outbound missions.5 A 1992 report by the National Academy of 
Sciences, Space Science Board unanimously concluded that forward 
contamination is not a significant hazard to the martian environment if Viking- 
type controls are used, but could be a problem for future in situ experiments 
specifically designed to search for evidence of extant or fossil martian 
organisms.2 The NAS recommendations for forward contamination controls 
distinguished between missions with and without life detection experiments 
because of lingering concerns about protection of experiments. They 
recommended that * landers carrying instrumentation for in situ investigation of 
extant martian life should be subject to at least Viking-level sterilization 
controls...", while "...spacecraft (including orbitek) without biological 
experiments should be subject to at least Viking-level presterilization 
procedures- such as clean-room assembly and cleaning of all components- 
for bioload reduction, but such spacecraft need not be sterilized." In general, 
public concerns about forward contamination have been minor, with little or no 
negative impact on missions to date. 
Back Contamination 
Despite previous experiences with sample return and back 
contamination controls during the Apollo Program, planning for Mars sample 
return is essentially in the conceptual stage. While much of the knowledge and 
experience from handling lunar samples will be helpful in mission planning, it 
cannot prepare NASA and its mission planners completely for a Mars sample 
return for a number of reasons. Major engineering and saentific questions must 
be answered before the public can be reassured that back contamination 
controls are effective and adequate. Numerous technical and engineering 
problems remain to be solved including: design of the sample return canister 
conditions; how to break surface contact with Mars and accomplish sterile 
insertion of the sample; development of a fail-safe system for monitoring the 
sample and canister during the long return flight: methods and equipment for 
recovering, handling and transferring the sample upon landing; design, 
location, construction and operation of quarantine facilities: and development of 
appropriate equipment and barriers for sample handling, testing and storage! 
Scientific research will also be needed to answer questions about Earth-based 
sampling and testing, especially those related to operational protocols for the 
quarantine facilities, testing methods and experimental protocols for samples, 
development of appropriate bioassays, and curation and control of samples. 
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It will also be necessary to overcome the organizational and management 
problems that contributed to inadequate protection against back contamination 
during the Apollo Program. As discussed by Bagby and Mahoneys, these 
included overt resistence to procedures by flight personnel, challenges to 
authority by non-NASA personnel, diminished attention to quarantine 
procedures in favor of other mission priorities, unfamiliarty of scientists with 
operational procedures at the quarantine facility, inadequate decontamination 
of laboratory personnel, and intraorganizational conflicts. 
Finally, in addition to the technical, sdentific, management and 
organizational issues facing mission planners, issues of back contamination 
have serious societal, legal and international implications. As noted by 
OeVincenti et al even when all the technical questions are answered, 
recommendations about planetary protections based purely on technical 
considerations may eventually play a secondary role in developing the final 
strategy for contamination controls, especially for back contarnination 
IMPORTANT NON-SCIENTIFIC AND SOCJAL FACTORS 
In the two decades since Apollo sample returns, significant changes 
have occurred in American public policy, with corresponding impacts on how 
the public and experts are involved in decision making g. Numerous examples 
can be found of scientific and technical projects that were frustrated by public 
challenges and concerns. Retrospective analyses of these diverse 
controversies have led to an understanding of how various factors contribute to 
project opposition in the public realm. Particular trends that have important 
implications for planning Mars sample returns include 1) a dramatically different 
external setting, 2) institutionalized public opposition and vigilance, 3) gradual, 
but significant shifts in the nature of public deasion making, and 4) an 
increasingly risk averse public and mass media.'* Each of these is discussed 
briefly below. 
1 ) Dramatically different external setting: Major changes in laws 
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that encourage increased public participation in the decision making 
process while imposing complex new regulations about health, 
environment and safety. NASA will be less able than in the past to make 
unilateral decisions about many critical aspects of sample return 
missions including quarantine, transportation, monitoring, environmental 
effects, and health concerns. 
2. Institutionalized public vigilance and opposition: Public 
vigilance and opposition are now essentially institutionalized both 
domestically and internationally in the form of well-funded, highly 
organized, non-governmental watchdog groups that monitor government 
actions, lobby political allies, conduct independent analyses, participate 
in regulatory and oversight processes, challenge government and 
corporate actions in court , and communicate with the public through the 
mass media. NASA already has faced costly legal challenges of the 
Galileo and Ulysses launches based on RTG's, nuclear materials in 
space, and possible launch accidents. Opponents of Mars missions 
could use a variety of laws (e.g., the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) and its impact statement requirements) in their attempts to stop 
sample returns. 
3. A gradual but significant shift in the nature of public decision 
making: Instead of being dominated by risk analyses and one way 
communication from experts, the decision making process is now highly 
political, with expectations of a two way dialogue involving government 
agencies, experts and the public. Debates about risk no longer focus 
exclusively on quantitative factors, but regularly inciude unmeasurable 
qualitative concerns and value judgements. Miscommunication can 
occur between experts and the public when different levels of a 
controversy are intermixed. Typically,' one can find three distinct levels in 
a controversy: an ideological or public policy focus dominated by 
.. 
philosophical questions of "should we do it"; a procedural focus, 
dominated by questions of "how should we do it"; and a local focus, 
dominated by questions of "why do it here or now?" In extremely 
complicated situations, all three levels can be involved simultaneously, 
mixing large societal questions and local opposition with the experts' 
task of assessing and managing the risks in a practical sense. 
Historically, NASA engineers and managers have been accustomed to 
reaching decisions through a highly technical process with only minimal 
input from the public. However, decisions about planetary pmtectiorr will 
undoubtedly impose a heavy load of soaal concerns onto mission 
planning, shifting the emphasis for decision making into a more public 
realm where it may be complicated by multiple perspedives. 
4. An increasingly risk averse public and mass media: Research 
has shown that the general public has become more risk averse over 
time, and that it perceives and judges risks differently than experts. In 
genera!, penp!e a!!aw rnmifi qua!i?a?i!ive ?=em (Le., involuntariness, 
dread, unfamiliarity, mistrust in institutions) to disproportionately 
influence their perceptions of risk more than technical quantitative 
features. These facts, combined with the general decrease in saentific 
literacy among the public, suggest that discussions about planetary 
protection and sample return may be complicated by fear, lack of 
understanding and an anti-technology bias. In addition, the public's 
selective concern with danger is powerfully shaped by the media, whose 
coverage of potentially hazardous events is governed more by a need to 
excite the public than to inform it . l  
Although gleaned from mostly American examples, these trends should 
not be viewed as uniquely American phenomena or responses. For example, 
Europe is experiencing a growth in both professional and public interest in the 
character and management of risks despite the fact that the public is less 
informed about their responsibilities, choices and legal options.'* Even in the 
emerging democracies, people are questioning government actions that could 
impact their health and environment. It's possible that international concerns, 
either alone or in combination with American opposition could challenge future 
sample returns. For example, in the Galileo launch, legal challenges in 
American courts were filed by an American group as intervener for German 
Green Party members who sought to protect their lands and people from 
potential environmental disasters similar to C hemobyl. 
COMPARISON WITH GENETIC ENGINEERING 
While it's impossible to predict how technical, engineering, management, 
operational, legal and social factors may combine to effect a particular mission 
or launch, it is possible to understand the planetary protection concerns of a 
mission by scrutinizing a situation with remarkable similarities. Such an 
example can be found in the "Ice Minus" controversy, an outdoor experiment in 
the mid-1980's involving the first intentional release of an organism created by 
. .  , 
I .  - .  . .. .. 
genetic engineering with recombinant DNA technology. Published reviews 
provide a detailed historical anatysis of events during the controversy as well as 
a lengthy discussion of the differences between scientific and public 
perceptions of the experiment.13 
Briefly, the project involved a small-scale field test of genetically 
engineered bacteria by universrty researchers to determine their effectiveness 
in preventing frost damage to agricultural plants. Opponents succeeded in 
delaying the experiment for five years through a succession of legal challenges 
and public policy maneuvers.that kept the debate in the public spotlight. They 
characterized the proposed experiment as reckless because it used a truly 
"exotic" organism which, they claimed, had the potential to cause untold 
environmental problems if released. The controversy ultimately involved 
federal, state and local government agenaes; legislative bodies and the courts; 
public hearings and environmental impact documents; and intense media 
coverage. A comparative analysis between ice minus and Mars sample return 
is useful ?o iden?i!y peten?ia! sres  c! pub!Ic consem. Impsmn! sirnilsees aid 
differences between the two cases can be seen in three general areas: 1) the 
nature of the organisms and experimental conditions, 2) characteristics and 
concerns of accident scenarios, and 3) the institutional and legal framework for 
each situation. 
Similar to the ice minus experiment with its novel, genetically engineered 
microbes, a sample return mission will involve the possibility of handling new, 
"exotic" life forms not found on Earth (Table 1). Both experiments involve the 
intentional handling and importation of a novel life form (as opposed to an 
accidental encounter), and scientists in government agencies were/are 
assigned the task of determining appropriate controls for monitoring the 
experiment. The ice minus experiment was propelled by questions of basic 
scientific interest with only indirect long term benefits to society in the form of 
possible frost protection for crops. A sample return mission will be based on the 
most basic of scientific questions related to the origin of life in the universe, and 
can claim no direct or indirect societal benefits except the generation of new 
knowledge. Another feature in common with ice minus is the division of expert 
opinion. Already, credible scientists are divided on whether life exists on Mars 
or would pose a risk to terrestrial organisms. Unfortunately, unlike the ice minus 
experiment which had elaborate pretesting under quarantined conditions, it will 
be difficult or impossible to conduct extensive pre-testing or experiments with 
organisms from Mars. Finally, like the ice minus experiment, Mars sample 
return is constrained by a specific time "window" during which conditions are 
suitable. Public controversy or indecision about permits for sample return 
missions could translate into extensive time delays and added costs, a serious 
problem considering the short duration of launch windows (in weeks) and the 
multi-year span between suitable launch windows. Like ice minus, the 
scientists' practical concerns about making quick decisions to proceed with the 
experiment could be misinterpreted as forcing a questinable decision on an 
unwilling public. 
Both ice minus and Mars sample return are similar in their accident 
scenarios and public perceptions (Table 2). Like ice minus whose opponents 
focused on worst case scenarios with drastic environmental and safety effects, a 
proposal to import Martian life is likely to face opponents' claims of dreaded or 
catastrophic consequences, uncontrollability, irreversibility, possible global 
impacts and effects on future generations. In the event of active public 
opposition, intense media attention can be expected, with the coverage ranging 
from accurate information to mild analogy to sensationalism bordering on 
science fiction. In the ice minus experiment the public was concerned about 
the wide range of risks it faced, from impacts on environment and health to 
possible consumer crop boycotts, The sentiment was voiced that such large 
risks far outweighed the comparative benefit of merely increasing scientific 
knowledge without any intended applications. With sample return, the public 
may question the inequitable distribution of risks and benefits, with the space 
community seen as reaping the potential benefits from a successful experiment, 
and the general or local population incurring the health and environmental risks 
should an accident occur. Opponents c a n  mise ethics! quns?Inns as we!!, 
noting that it is morally wrong to interfere with the evolution of life, whether by 
genetic engineering or on another planet. In addition, for both ice minus and 
Mars sample return, potential accidents are seen as completely avoidable 
because they are caused by deliberate human action rather than "acts of God." 
Using this reasoning, some argue that the best way to avoid a problem is not to 
undertake the experiment at all. Many of these claims and concerns are difficult 
or impossible to address factually in the decision making process through 
environmental impact statements and permit documents. 
Finally, for both ice minus and Mars sample return, areas of legal and 
institutional ambiguity abound (Table 3). The initial legal challenges against ice 
minus came in part from assertions that NIH guidelines for handling genetically 
engineered organisms were not legally enforceable regulations. Current and 
past planetary protection controls are likewise based on legally non- 
enforceable guidelines promulgated by COSPAR. The ice minus experiment 
remained in the public spotlight intermittently for several years until areas of 
legal uncertainty were resolved through legislative and public hearings, agency 
deliberations and in the courts. Among the key legal issues were questions of 
which agency or agencies had ultimate control and authority for issuing permits 
for genetic engineering, and whether new or existing environmental laws and 
regulations should be applied for this new area of experimentation. Additional 
complexity was added by conflicting jurisdictional questions at federal, state 
and local levels covering topics ranging from environmental impact statement 
requirements to transportation permits, quarantine controls, neighborhood 
zoning and experimental monitoring. For Mars sample return mission, lawyers 
have pointed out that legal obstades could arise from uncertainty about control 
and authority, international treaty obligations, and constitutional concerns about 
quarantine, public health and safety .I4* l5 Other legal requirements may also 
arise under various domestic regulatory laws, but details will vary depending 
on the specific mission profile. 
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The controversy over ice minus and genetic engineering caused the 
establishment of the Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee, a federal 
interagency group to debate and resolve complex questions. For the Apollo 
Program, decisions about back contamination controls, quarantine protocols 
and quarantine facilities were handled by an Interagency Committee on Back 
Contamination (ICBC). Because there is no modem day counterpart to ICBC, 
future establishment of an interagency body may be needed to handle 
questions about sample return and planetary protection controls, especially in 
the face of today’s more complex environmental, health and safety laws. As 
was seen in the ice minus experiment, citizens’ involvement is almost assured 
for sample return because of the openness of current government decision 
making processes. In addition, both domestic and international environmental 
groups and public advocacy organizations can make use of American laws to 
challenge proposed scientifidtechnical actions- International groups such as 
the United Nations, the World Health Organization, and the International Labor 
Organization have also attempted to address questions invoIving.protedon of 
Earth’s environment and minimizaion of risk to populations from space 
exploration activity.2 Even if Russia or some other nation undertakes a sample 
return, many of the same questions and challenges could be raised, as citizens 
worldwide have become more vigilant about questioning proposed government 
actions with potential environmental and heatth consequences. 
CONCL USION 
Despite the preponderance of similarities between the ice minus 
experiment and Mars sample return, there is one important way in which they 
are very different. Throughout the public debate about ice minus and genetic 
engineering, the university and its researchers were entirely reactive, 
proceeding one step at a time in response to public challenges, legal action or 
agency requests for information. There was essentially no institutional advance 
planning on how to proceed through the decision making and permit process. 
The experiment was scientifically and legally a test case, with little precedent to 
guide it. In contrast, those involved in future sample return missions can be 
proactive in many ways. Assuming at least a decade before a sample return 
mission would occur, it is possible to identify key planetary protection areas 
needing special research and planning, much in the way that advance 
development is done for mission hardware and technology. 
Typically, in the early phases of any mission planning, NASA has almost 
complete internal control over questions and how it chooses to handle them. 
On most projects, there is a tendency to concentrate first on the hardware, 
technology, mission architecture and costs, leaving environmental values and 
non-scientific aspects in the background, to be dealt with at a later stage in a 
way that minimizes added project costs. However, relegating the study of 
social, environmental and non-scientific factors to a later stage of planning is ill 
advised for a controversial Mars sample return mission and may, in the long 
run, be more costly in many ways. According to NASA’s internal NEPA 
guidelinesl6, “consideration of the possible environmental effects of any NASA 
actions must be included at the earliest stages of study and planning, just as are 
technical and economic factors. Decisions - or recommendations for 
decisions-- must be made with as full a knowledge and understanding of the 
likely environmental effects as is possible ..." In addition, Presidential Directive 
NSC-25 requires Presidential review and approval for "experiments which by 
their nature could reasonably be expected to result in domestic or foreign 
allegations that they might have major and protracted effects on the physical or 
biological environment or other amas of public or private interest.."17 Once the 
public becomes aware of the behind-the-scences decision making about a 
sample return mission and its possible risks, subsequent discussions could 
easily shift into the public realm, over which NASA has far less control. 
Without serious, proactive and early attention to questions of legal uncertainty, 
mission architecture, human vs. robotic sample return, risk assessments, risk 
perceptions, management problems, quarantine planning, public 
communication. and media response, NASA may find itself inadequately 
prepared to deal with public questions. Not only would planning for the mission 
be complicated, but NASA might face major delays, increased costs and even 
missed launch windows as it responded in a totally reactive mode to legal and 
public demands for more analysis or information. Considering the striking 
similarities with the ice minus experiment, such proactive research and 
planning would be prudent to anticipate problem areas and minimize the 
chances of social and non-scientific factors becoming major mission 
impediments. Delay or avoidance in dealing with the social and non-scientific 
factors is indefensible, either legally, practically or ethically.2918 If NASA and 
other space agencies are seriously committed to future Mars sample return 
missions, it is important to acknowledge from the start the degree to which 
social and non-scientific factors could complicate missions in unpredictable 
ways. 
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Table 1 
COMPARISON OF ORGANISM AND EXPERIMENTAL CONDlnONS 
Novel llfe form created by genetic 
engineering. Lac% of publk planet. Lack of publlc understandlng 
understandlng about "mutant" about nature of llfe on  Mars and the 
organisms and recombinant DNA 
technology. 
First lntentlonal releaso of a genetically 
engineered organism into an open air 
environment samples. 
Reason for experlment was to test 
sc!e~!f!c h.,-o:hssss W d t  r i m h i  imsi 
protection and ecological competition. No 
anticipated applications or products from the 
experiment. No Immediate publlc beneftt besides knowledge. 
benefit .  
Truly "exotlc" llfe form from another 
debate over extant vs. extinct life forms. 
First Intentional lmponatlon and 
handling of extraterrestrial sample since lunar 
Reason for sample return based on 
sieniiiic hypoiheses about me evoiutiin 
of life in the cosmos. No anticipated 
applications and no lmmedlate public 
Slte specific design h tlght controls on 
experimental conditions imposed by planetary protectlon controls. Likely to 
government regulators to minimize human 
exposure and/or spread of organism beyond 
test plot. 
During pre-experiment debate. experts 
were dlvlded on level and types of 
rlsks posed by experlment. The majority 
of mainstream scientists fett the experiment 
was low risk from scientific. environmental and 
public heatth standpoints. worked out. 
Extenslve background Information was 
avallable from pretests with adual 
recombinant organism under contained 
greenhouse conditions. Good data on nom 
pathogenici of test organism to animals, 
humans and plants. 
Mission design will incorporate strkt 
have many environmental. health and safety 
requirements imposed for general sample 
handling and site specific quarantine. 
Experts currently dlvlded on vlews 
about llfe on Mars. Most believe that life on 
presentday Mars is improbable and would not 
pose a threat to Earths environment. Details 
about sample handling and testing mist still be 
lmposslble or very dlfflcult to protest 
martlan samples prlot to sample return 
to develop extensive background infomration 
on organismqs). Depending on the success 
of robotic precursor mission(s), may have 
limited data on pathogenicity or other 
characterislics d martian life prior to sample 
return. 
Expetlment faced the constraint of a 
"blologlcal wlndow", with suitable 
experimental conditions found pnmanty in eady 
spring (a a secondary "window' in early W) 
Each delay in makmg permit decisions resulted 
in putting the experiment off by an entire 
growing season. In the end, multiple 
challenges led to f i e  years of delay. 
Mlsslons to Mars face tlght "launch 
WlndOwS", based on planemy alignment and 
launch preparation requirements. Leigal 
challenges or delays in obtaining necessary 
permits could caused missed launch windows 
with costly delays. 
Table 2 
ACCIDENT SCENARIO AND PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS 
Publlc concerns focused on worn case 
scenrrfo (changmg gbbal weather patterns, 
uncontrolled -0Scape-d microbe to natural 
environment). Publlc perceptkns were 
shaped by concam over dreaded 
outcomes, involuntary oxposun and 
uneven rlsks vs. benefits, 
Media coverage Included focus on fear 
ana sensationalism, at times bordering on 
science fiction (mutant potatoes, ‘gem-, 
dreaded global disruption, loss of crops and 
economic livelihood) 
Focusing on areas of scientific uncertainty and 
accident possibilities, public questloned 
trustworthlness of declslons by 
sclentists and bureaucrats 
Many unquantlflables compllcated 
declslon maklng process (e.g. possibility of 
a consumer boycott. ethical and .ideological 
concerns about m y i n g  God”, uncertain 
environmental and health impacts of 
biotechnology; irreversibility, etc) 
Environmental Impact Statement 
requires artlculatlon of worst case 
scenario, which the public is likely to foars on 
(e.g.,breach of quarantine facilities, escape at 
organisms, expbsions, human emf, 
“accidents”). Publlc perceptions llkely to 
be shaped by dreaded rlsks & 
Involuntary exposure. 
Likely medla attentlon wlll cover factual 
lnformatlon as well as controversy, 
perceptlons and sensationalism 
(Martians, Andromeda Strain, infectious agents, 
extraterrestrials, protests etc.). 
Based on agency accident history and past 
failure to follow Apoilo sample return protocols, 
public may have reason to dlstrust 
NASA’s ability to follow PP controls as 
planned. 
Unquantlflables wlll be part of declslon 
making procsss (ex., moral issue of 
interfering with evolution of life on another 
planet: difficult to estimate risk probabilities with 
unknown organism; possibility of human emr in 
handling and quarantine; etc.) 
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Table 3 
INSTITUTIONAL & LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
lnltlal petmlt request based on now 
enforceable NIH guidelines and policies 
for recombinant DNA experiments 
Represented a test case with legal 
challenges based on malor questlons 
about agency authorltles and 
responslbliltles (NIH vs. EPA vs. USDA as 
well as state and kcal jurisdictional corcems) 
and uncertainty about appropriate laws 
(toxics laws vs. pesticide laws vs. plant pathogen 
laws vs.ptuposed new biotechnology laws ) 
Experienced many and confllctlng legal 
requirements (experimental permits. 
programmatic environmental impact statements, 
transportation permits, zoning ordinances, 
laboratory biosafety requirements, federal & 
state environmental impact statements) 
Legal questions and jUriSdictioM1 concerns led 
to establishment of Interagency biotech 
coordlnatlng committee and many 
legislative hearings 
Cltlzens advocacy group involvement 
allowed via NEPA and CEQA processes. 
Intense medla attention of controversy and 
decision making process at national, state and 
local levels. 
~ 
Unlverslty sclentlsts and admlnlstrators 
were In a totally reactive mode for the 
duration of the controversy. No control overthe 
length of time to resolve controversy in public 
arena. 
Current planetary protection controls 
based on non-enforceable COSPAR 
guidellnes and space agency policies. 
Many current legal questions about 
agency authorities and responslbllltles 
(NASA vs. EPA vs. others agencies) and 
uncertainty about appropriate laws 
(NEPA, NASA authorizing legislation, 
quarantine and public health laws, transportation 
laws, etc). Possible other questions based on 
international treaties. 
Llkely to face many and conflicting legal 
requirements (permits for quarantine facility , 
federal environmental impact statements for 
missions and sample returns, transportation 
permits from landing site, health and bosafety 
permits, presidential or national security review, 
etc.) 
May need to establish an interagency 
committee on back contamlnatlon as 
seen during Apllo Program. Uncertain whether 
legislative hearings might needed. 
Domestlc and International opposition 
groups or lndlvlduals could challenge 
pbns for sample return using US laws. 
intense medla coverage could be 
expected. 
NASA admlnlstrators have opportunity 
to be proactive before controversy erupts in 
public. Selective pre-planning and advanced 
research should help minimize impact of 
probable challenges from external sources. 
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In summary, the inf?ared spectra indicate the presence of HMT having absorption 
features which should be visible in the middle infrared spectra of comets and interstellar 
ice grains, and the photochemistry of HMT under astronomical conditions may lead to the 
identification of the origin of the cyanide long observed in the tail of comets. 
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T3 f3- LEGAL ASPECTS OF PLANETARY r3.4- TITAN'S ATMOSPHERE COMPOSITION : 
n-l*oa PROTECTION FOR MARS MISSIONS n.i.02 CERTAINTIES AND SPECULATIONS 
* 
eM, and L.I. Tennen 
Law Ofliccr of Stems and Tennen 
The planning and execution of manned and robotic 
missions to Mars present a wide range of junsprudcntial 
issucS. Provisions to prevent the diauption of natural akstial 
environment$ as we11 as damage to the environment of Earth 
by the m u m  of extraterrestrial materials. a n  important 
components of the law applicable to mankind's activities in 
outer space. and have been supplemented by scientifidly 
instituted planetary proteaion policies However. c o n f l i i g  
legal regimes may exist, as the space treaties in force an 
neither uniform in their provisions. nor identical as to the 
states which have signed. ratifkd, or adopted the intnmlional 
agreements. The legal requirements applicable to a spa5f1c 
mission will vary depending on the entities conducting the 
program and specific mission profile This artide anaiylcs the 
which will influence the determination of the stlndvds of 
conduct which will govan manned and robotic missions to 
MUS. 
! 
divagent intanational legal rrgimes together with thc fanors 
r3.3- SOCIETAL ISSUES As mss10N LWDImNTS: 
H.l.09 PWIETA?Y PROTECPION AND CONTAYINATION 
CONCEPNS 
!!.S. Race . 
Botanical Garden, Unlv. of California at 
Rerkelev, USA 
Societal and non-scientific cactors repre- 
sent nocenciallv sl~ni~ieanc lmocdlments for future 
Mars missions, esneciallv i n  areas involvinr nlanetnrv 
nrocection. thio .scudv analvzes nublfc concerns about 
forward contsminacion EO tInrs and back contamination t c  
Earth nnd evaluacce rnaior arcas where lack of infomu- 
Cion mov lead to uncontrollable Lmnntr on future 
nlsslons. The mtiidv concludes chac NASA should adont a 
atratcrv that nccivelv nlans both the p.enerac1on and 
0. Cau t l e r  
Obse rva to l r e  de Paris-Meudon. Meudon 
France 
Our knowledge of the atmospheric compo- 
sltlon of Titan in 1980 has been drastically 
improved these last years f r o m  an indepth analysis 
of all  data obtained during the encounter of 
Voyager w l t h  Tttan and from subsequent g m d  
based near infrared and milllrneter observations. 
The nature of the surface of Titan. the existence 
of tropospheric methane clouds. the composition 
and distribution of aerosols and the degree of 
complexity of the organic chemistry ocarrrfng 
in the atmosphere of the satellite a m  still 
debatable. A m  also controversial the temporal 
variability of the photochemistry. the pattern 
of the winds and the existence of a llke-venus 
suoerotation of the high atmosphere. 
m.4- THE ORGANIC HAZE ON TITAN 
CP. McKay. Space Science Division 
MS 2 6 3 .  NASA A m  Research Carer 
n. 1. 03 
Moffett Field CA 94035- IOOO. USA 
Titan's annosphere is of interest to exobiology primady 
because of the chcmid conversion of the gascs a and NX 10 
solid organic material Based upon laboratory studies and 
Voyager observations we have some undersunding of the 
physical and opucd pmpcnics of the Tim haze. Howcva. 
our undersunding of the gas to solid conversion pmccn on 
Tim is incomplete. Key questions that remain concern the 
processes that occur in the size range too small to be 
considered by microphysical models and too large to be 
considered bv uhotochcmicnl models. Of pjnicular intaest 
should be th;d&clopmcnt of modds hac c& explain the c/N 
ncio (- I) in the organic haze and the production m e  (- W1 
kg m -2 si). 
TITAN'S PHOTOCHMICAL AEROSOLS 
subscauenc nanmemenc of planecant nrocection infonna- 
Cion to ensure that kev audiences obtain needed lnfor- p3*'- 
mation in a tlrnelv manner. neliw or avoidance in deal-n'1'04 
inn wlth societal issues earlv in niselon plannfnR vi11 
increase che likelihood of public onnosition. cost ln- 
creases and missed launch vindovs. These findinus alsa 
have fnplicatlons €or RTG launches, nuclear nronulsion 
and other NASA activities nerceived t o  have health. 
safecv or enviranmcntal imlications. 
F3.4- ORIGIN OF TITAN'S ATMOSPHERE 
n. 1.01 
T. Owen, Institute for Astronomy. University 
of Hawaii, 2680 Woodlawn Drive, Honoiulu. 
HI 96822, USA 
The absence of abundant Ne on Titan indicates that the 
atmos here must be semndary, a d t  of degass 
wlaheat ion of the solid materials that a d  t%nn the 
satellite. This aoQption d d  have involved materials frorn 
50th the Sarurrian mheht!a and from the solar nebula 
itself. The destruction of CO in Titin's u atmsphere 
together with the hi value of D/H in 8 E s  methane 
suggest a primordi Pon 'n for Titan's CO and Nz The 
presence of N , CO and FO, on Triton tends to remfonx 
this idea. Co&iation can come from detection of large 
amounts of solid CO on the surface, or abundant, non- 
radiogenic argon in &e atmosphere 
and 
585 
A. Bar-Nun and I Klelnfeld 
Dept. of Geophysics 6 PLanetary Sciences 
Tel Aviv University. T a l  Aviv. Israel. 
The unsaturated compounds in Titan's atmosphere: 
CzH2. C2Hh and HCN polymerize photochemically. to 
form aerosol particles. The optical properties of 
the aerosols from each material and their 
agglomeration into non-spherical partfcles were 
studied in our laboratory. We are currently 
studying the properties of co-polymers, formed by 
irradiation of mlxtures of C2H2, C2H4 and HCN 
together. 
These aerosols are sticlcy even ac -2OOC urd ..- 
could coat the Huygens probe during its &scent: 
through Titan's acmosphere. 
F3.4- THE N A W  OFTITAN'S AEROSOLS: 
1.1. os LABoRAlroRY SUNLAnONS 
T. w. 
S.U.N-y BrookNASA Ams. USA 
The atmosphm of Titan i s  hown to conrain auus~k as evidtncai 
by h e  IbyagerobsaMdonsof at least three hate lap% 
I FIFTH SYMPOSIUM ON 
CHEMICAL EVOLUTION 
& THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF LIFlE 
and 
THE WORKSHOP ON 
MARS EXOBIOLOGY SCIENCE STRAmGY 
ApriI 25-29, 1994 
NASA Ames Research Cmter 
Sponsored by: 
Exobiology Program 
Office of Space Science 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Organized by: 
Michael Meyer, NASA Headquarters, Washington D.C. 
John Kerridge, NASA Headquarters, Washington D.C. 
Donald I, DeVincenzi, NASA Ames Research Center 
Local Coordinator: 
Sara E, Acevedo, SETI Institute 
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. IMPLICATIONS OF LEGAL UNCERTAlNTlES, PUBLlC PERCEPTIONS, 
AND THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS. FOR 
MARS SAMPLE RETURN MISSIONS 
I 
Margaret S. Race 
College of Natural Resources 
University of California at Berkeley 
In discussing implementation approaches for future Mars mission, it is important to 
acknowledge the public and legal context in which mission decision making will occur. 
When compared with similar public science controversies, such as genetic 
engineering, Mars sample return missions possess every element of the worst case 
scenario for soda1 debate and controversy. As scientists, engineers, mission planners 
and administrators develop planetary protection requirements for Mure missions, they 
must be mindful of the many environment, health and safety concerns likely to surface 
for missions involving sample return to Earth. Changes in the legal and decision 
making envirnnments sime !he !ime s? Apo!!s sampla retdrns h i e  pmibed the pubiic 
with many ways to challenge or delay missions and their launches. To the extent that 
planetary protection questions are unresolved at the time of an actual mission, they 
offer convenient footholds for public challenges in both legal and decision making 
realms, over which NASA will have little control. 
Two particular areas in the social and non-scientific realms are especially ikely to 
complicate mission planning and implementation: 1) questions related to legal 
uncertainty and the decision making process and 2) public perception of risks 
associated with sample return. In combination they have a great potential to adversely 
effect future mission costs and timing. Particular legal questions that may cause 
problems include uncertainty about institutional control and authority over decision 
making; international treaty obligations: and constitutional and regulatory concerns 
about quarantine, public health and safety. Additionally, the public's perceptions of 
the risks and values of sample return could'prove problematic, especially if adverse 
perceptions contribute to legal challenges. Understanding public perceptions will be 
critical to developing effective and appropriate information for various audiences 
concerned with sample returns. To minimize mission impediments, it is essential that 
NASA incorporate both legal and public considerations into the earliest planning 
phases so as to anticipate problem areas and prepare for legitimate public questions 
and challenges to sample return missions. 
'3. 
I 
pace scientists and engineers will plan missions to 
return samples from other worlds to Earth before S they have answers to questions about the possibility 
of life on those worlds. We know Mars as well as, perhaps 
better than, any other extraterrestrial planet in our solar sys- 
tem, yet we cannot say for certain whether life ever existed 
there, or if it still does. Consequently, the spacefaring na- 
tions will continue to impose planetary protection controls 
on missions to avoid the risk of alien organisms contami- 
nating Earth or terrestrial organisms invading other worlds. 
Before official protection requirements are established 
for Mars sample return missions, we must consider a variety 
of social and political issues as these missions are planned. 
If ignored, these issues could become serious impediments. 
When the Apollo a ~ t r o ~ u t s  returned to Earth with sam- 
ples of the Moon, their mission planners faced a different, 
and in some ways more innocent, world. In the intervening 
years, public attitudes about technological hazards have 
shifted, causing public policies to change. Let’s look at four 
particularly noteworthy shifts that have implications for 
sample return missions: 
1. A dramatically different legal and regulatory envi- 
ronment. Laws and government institutions have changed 
to enmurage public participation in the decision-making 
process. At the same time, imposing and complex new 
regulations about health, environment and safety have 
been instituted. 
2. Institutionalized public vigilance. Today, public 
vigdance is maintained by well-funded, highly organized, 
nongovernmental watchdog groups. As we’ve seen with 
the challenges to launching Galileo and Wl~vsse.~, whch 
carried plutonium power plants, opponents can scrutinize 
missions for perceived or actual environmental, health and 
safety risks. They can use a variety of legal avenues in 
attempts to stop a mission. 
Mission planners will also have to consider the policies 
of international groups, such as the United Nations and the 
World Health Organization, which have addressed concerns 
I 
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about protecting Earth and minimizing risk to populations 
from space exploration activities. 
3. Politicization of technological debates and shifts in 
the nature of public decision-making. Since Apollo times, 
there has been a g m d d  but significant shift in the nature of 
public decision-making, from unquestioning acceptance of 
closed-door, unilateral decisions by experts to the expecta- 
tion of open communication among government agencies, 
experts and the public. If concerns about risk thrust technical 
discussions about planetary protection into the public realm, 
such dmussions will be complicated by questions that are 
difficult or impossible to answer with scientific data. 
4. A risk-averse public combined with mass media 
average focusing on hazards and disasters. The public 
is less willing to accept risk and more wary of technology, 
and expects experts to prove in advance that activities will 
pose no risk. Mass media coverage, which often focuses 
on potential accidents and disasters, powerfully shapes 
perceptions about risk Sensationalized media coverage 
about planetary protection and sample return missions 
could intensify public anxiety. 
While it’s impossible to predict exactly how the public will 
respond to sample return proposals, it’s advisable to antici- 
pate complications. As people with demonstrated interest in 
planetary exploration, Planetary Society members will be 
among those who will weigh the benefits and the risks. 
T~H Ice-minu~i f+cprrrlencre 
One way to anticipate problems is to scrutinize past contro- 
versies. A good case is the public debate over genetic engi- 
neering in the mid-1980s centering on a new organism 
created by recombinant DNA technology. Although it did not 
involve extraterrestrial organisms, this so-called ice-minus 
experiment illustrates the kinds of concerns and controver- 
sies possible for planetary sample return missions. 
The ice-minus controversy involved the first intentional . 
release of a genetically engineered organism into Earth’s 
environment. A team of university researchers sought govern- 
ment permits for a small-scale field test of a mutant bacteri- 
um to determine the strain’s effectiveness in preventing frost 
damage to agricultural plants. Opponents characterized the 
experiment as reckless because it used an organism not 
naturally found in the environment. They claimed it might 
cause drastic problems if‘ released. 
Through a succession of legal challenges and public 
policy maneuvers, opponents maintained a lengthy public 
debate over genetic engineering. By the time the experi- 
ment was done-without incident-nearly five years later, 
the controversy had involved federal, state and local gov- 
ernment agencies; legislative bodies and the courts; public 
hearings and environmental impact documents; and intense 
media coverage. 
Let’s examine some similarities to possible sample return 
scenarios, focusing on a Mars mission. 
clew L*e-fnrms 
Like the ice-minus experiment, a sample return mission 
could involve the deliberate handling and importation 
of new life-forms under experimental conditions. 
The ice-minus experiment was spurred by basic scientific 
. _._. . .  -. . .  .. :. . _. ._ . .. ._ . .  
. .  . . . .  - . .  . .. .. .. . 
questions, with only indirect benefits to society rn the form 
of frost protection for crops. A sample mum mission will 
be based on scientific questions about the nature of the 
planets and life in the universe, with no predictable societal 
benefits except the generation of new knowledge. 
Experts were divided in their opinions of the risks of the 
ice-minus organism, but the majority judged the experiment 
to be of low risk. Despite extensive testing under quarantine 
before the actual experiment, opponem.~ remained unmn- 
vinced and continued to challenge it Today, most scientists 
expect that martian soil samples are uulikely to contain 
life, although they continue to debate whether life exists on 
Mars or would pose a risk to terrestrial organisms. Even if 
Mars samples were handled under stringent quarantine, the 
public might still view the possibility of escape, however 
low, as a threat to the terrestrial biosphere. 
Finally, the ice-minus experiment was comtriibed by a 
seasonal window. Mars sample rem missions are limited 
by launch windows a few weeks low that occur only every 
two years. Legal challenges, public controversy or indeci- 
sion could translate into delays and added costs. As with 
ice minus, scientists' practical concerns about reaching a 
decision to proceed could be misinterpreted as forcing a 
questionable decision on an unwilling public. 
The P e r r e p t l o n  of R15k 
The public may raise many concerns that are difficult or 
impossible to address factually. Proposals to import martian 
soil samples could face claims of dreaded or even cat~310phic 
consequences, such as uncontrollability. irreversibility and 
global effects for present and future generations. As with 
ice minus, the public may question both the value of the 
benefits and a perceived inequitable distribution of risks 
and benefits. Space scientists and engineers could be seen 
as reaping the benefits, but the general or local population 
could incur the risks if an accident occurred. 
Because of the complexity of the debate. it is question- 
able how well the mass media will convey information. 
Their coverage is likely to range from accurate information 
to mild analogy to sensationalism bordering on science 
fiction. 
WhI3TI Cal l  the Shrrk? 
The initial legal challenges to ice minus came, in part, from 
assertions that guidelines for handling genetically engi- 
neered organisms were imposed by a federal organization 
that did not have the authority to either write or enforce 
regulations under existing laws. From the earliest days, 
planetary protection controls have been based on nonstatu- 
tory guidelines from COSPAR (the Committee on Space 
Research of the lntemational Council of Scientific Unions), 
a nongovernmental organization concerned with coopera- 
tive international space research. The ice-minus experiment 
remained in the public spotlight for years until areas of 
legal uncertainty were resolved through legislative and 
public hearings. agency deliberations and the courts. For 
Mars sample returns, lawyers have already pointed out that 
legal obstacles could arise from uncertainty about control 21 
.. .. 
. .  . .  
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. . .  
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and authority, international treaty obligations, constitutional 
concerns about quarantine and environmental impacts. 
During the Apollo pro-gam. a specially established Inter- 
agency Committee on Back Contamination (ICBC) handled 
the decisions about back-contamination controls, quarantine 
protocols and facilities. Similarly, the federal Interagency 
or Russia, the United F nations planning to expl 
sion is high on their agendas 
the major features of 
rofile reflects current 
corporates a set of constraint 
on concerns. 
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Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee was estab- ’ .: :. 
lished to resolve complex genetic engineering questions. It 
may be necessary to set up an interagency body to handle 
questions about planetary protection, especially in the face 
of today’s more complex environmental, health and safety 
laws. 
Recmgnlang the RI&~ to Hnnw 
For a high-profile mission like a Mars sample return, the 
intermhonal space agencies will need to do everything in 
their power if they are to avoid criticism and ensure success. 
They must treat societal concerns about such missions seri- 
ously from the start. 
In NASA, for example, there is a tendency to concentrate 
on hardware, technology and mission architecture, with non- 
technical topics seen as undesired add-ons that complicate 
the mission and increase costs. For sample return missions, 
relegating social, environmental and nonscientific issues 
to a later stage of planning may u lmte ly  prove more costly, 
both economically and otherwise. 
With any sample return mission, the space agencies will 
face unavoidable legal requirements. For example, the 
international Outer Space Treaty requires that appropriate 
measures be taken to ensure that space activities are con- 
ducted to avoid harmful contamination of celestial bodies 
or adverse changes in Earth’s environment. 
In the United States, NASA has interpreted the National 
Environmental Policy Act as requiring “consideration of the 
Dossible environmental effects of any NASA actions at the 
to vt 
ched 
single mket .  
The spacecraft fly to Mars (approximately nine months). . 
Lander is targeted to predetermined site. 
Rover collects samples of rocks, soil and crust. 
Pure atmospheric samples are t a k a  
All samples are stored in canisters under near-Mars 
conditions. 
M y s  ascent vehicle with canisters launches into 
Mars orbit. 
Vehicle and orbiter rendezvous. 
Sample canisters are transfend to sterile vault on 
orbiter without contaminatmg the sample return capsule. 1 
Vault is sealed to provide biological containment. 
Orbiter fires engines to return to Earth. 
Sample return capsule separates and directly reenters 
the atmosphere. 
Capsule is retrieved by helicopter air snatch. 
Sample vault is opened under sterile conditions in a 
high-containment facility. 
Samples are tested for living organisms, biological 
hazards, and tomcity with a quarantine protocol. 
Samples are released for multidisciplinary ady%S. 
e 
* 
karliest stages of study and planning in order for recom- 
mendations and decisions to be made with full howledge 
and understanding of the likely environmental effects. 
NASA will also have to respond to government regulatory 
agencies with authority over quarantine, environmental or 
safety areas. 
Considering the quarantine problems during the Apollo 
missions and the recent failures of Challenger, the Hubble 
Space Telescope and Mars Observer, the regulatory agencies 
and the public may accept nothing short of comprehensive 
analysis and full disclosure as required by law. It is almost 
certain that NASA will face public challenges about sample 
return risks long before launch time. 
For sample returns from space, the public concerns will 
undoubtedly be centered on back contamination. These same 
concerns are likely to generate the most media attention. 
Just as with the ice-minus experiment, scientists’ explana- 
tions of technological design and their reassurances of ex- 
ceedingly low risk will not deter people from challenging 
the mission. 
Ultimately, it is for citizens to determine the types and 
degrees of risk they will accept. Thomas Jefferson wrote, 
“I know of no safe deposirory of the ultimate powers of the 
society but the people themselves, and if we think them not 
enlightened to exercise their control with a wholesome 
discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to 
inform their discretion.” 
That is precisely what the space agencies of Earth must 
do during every phase of mission planning and sample 
return from other worlds. 
1 
Margaret S. Race is an environmental policy anal-vst and 
assistant dean in the College of Natural Resources at the 
University of California, Berkeley. 
Your opinion collnk 9 
The opinions you as a member of The Planetary Society have about planetary exploration are important in formulating plans for future explorations of the planet 
Mars. We would very much appreciate R if you would take a few moments of your time to complete the following survey. When you are done, remove the survey 
from the magazine by tearing along the perforation, and fold it as indicated. The return address is already printed on the survey. A summary of the survey results 
will appear in a future issue of The Planetary Report. Thank you very much. 
For each question, check one box. Please Micate your level of agreement or d i s a g m m t w i t h  each ofthe 
What proportion of the articles in this issue 
of The Planetary Report have you read? 
following items by drding one response per Item. o m  
0 Morethanhalf 
0 Lessthanhalf 
0 Noneyet Life, in some form, exists on other 
planets in our solar system. SD D A - SA DK 
Which of the following best describes how you feel about the benefits 
of planetary exploration compared to the risks of interplanetary 
contamination? 
Intelligent life exists on other planets 
in the universe. SD D A" SA DK 
0 BENEFITS GREATER than risks 
0 Benefits and risks EOUAL 
If there is intelligent life on another 
plan& it poses no threat to us. SD D A SA DK 
- . 
E K3ifl G"*rER rhan .mefirs _ -  'Ko-btic space missions wiii teii us 
allweneedtoknowaboutotherplanets. SD D A SA DK 
It is hiehlv Drobable that life. in some 
- ~ - - 
Please indicate your level of agrsement or disagreement with each of the 
followina items bv circlina one response oer item. 
Space exploration is essential to the 
future of our society. SD D A SA DK 
1 am familiar with NASA's plans to 
conductmissionstothesurfaceofMars. SD D A SA DK 
Listed below are four categoriesof benefibtb socidythatcwld result 
from planetary exploration. For each ategory, indicate how you feel 
about the benefits of planetary exploration by circling one response. 
Economic LB M B H B  
Scientific LB M B H B  
Military LB M B m  
Human fulfillment LB M B H B  
Listed below are a number of hazards. For each hazard, please rate the 
risk for your counlry as a whde by circlhg one response. 
Radon 
Genetically engineered bacteria 
Ozone layer depletion 
Satellite debris 
Nuclear power plants 
Biological contamination from Mars 
missions in the future 
Bacteria in food 
Electromagnetic fields 
Asteroids 
Global warming 
Pesticides in food 
A N S  
A N S  
A N S  
A N S  
A N S  
A N S  
A N S  
A N S  
A N S  
A N S  
AN S 
M H DK 
M H DK 
M H DK 
M H DK 
M H DK 
M H DK 
M H DK 
M H DK 
M H DK 
M H DK 
M H DK 
Y * .  
form, exists on Mars. 
It is morallv -ne to brine life back 
;. .f :::g..:.:, ..... . . . . .  . -  . 
. . . . .  . .  . . . .  . . .  . . .  
It is morally wrong to mtroduce life 
from Earth onto another planet. SD D A SA DK 
Humans on space missions should not 
directly contact the surface of other 
planets in our solar system. SD D A SA DK 
If there is any form of life on Mars, 
it should be left there unhsturbed. SD D A SA DK 
Any mission that could expose Earth 
tolifefromMarsshouldbecancelled. SD D A SA DK 
lf there is life on Mars, it poses no 
threat to life on our planet. SD D A SA D K '  
contamination of the martian environ- 
ment by Earth life is not a sigdicant 
hazard of planetary exploration. SD D A SA DK 
: .. . 
An asteroiddetection system is 
essential to the security of Earth 
and its inhabitants. 
I would favor the development of 
defense systems to intercept and 
deflect asteroids that threaten Earth. 
No form of life presently on Earth 
can survive unprotected in space. 
If then is life on Mars, it most likely 
has adapted to that specific environ- 
ment and would not survive here. 
If there is life on Mars, it has 
survived in such severe conditions 
that it would probably thrive on Earth. 
The environment on Mars is too 
harsh to sustain any life from Earth 
SD D A SA DK 
SD D A SA DK . 
SD D A SA DK 
SD D A SA DK 
SD D A SA DK _ - _  . .  
SD D A SA DK 
If Earth and Mars were 
contaminated millions of years ago by 
meteorites from each other, then there 
is no reason to be concerned about 
planetary protection today. 
All materials brought to Earth from 
Mars should be considered hazardous 
until proven otherwise. 
Life that has evolved in Earth's rich 
natural environment would not be fit 
enough to survive on Mars. 
Experiments done on Mars will be 
sufficient to determine whether it is 
safe to bring materials back to Earth. 
The benefits to society of the super- 
conducting supercollider would be 
worth its costs if it were built 
The benefits to society of mapping 
the human genome are worth its costs. 
SD D 
SD D 
SD D 
SD D 
SD D 
SD D 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
SA DK 
SA DK 
SA DK 
SA DK 
SA DK 
SA DK 
More funds should be devoted to the 
searchforextraterrestrialintelligence. SD D A SA DK 
Decisions about health and safety 
risks should be left to the experts. SD D .,A ,,.SA< DK 
/. , - ; We should reduce or eliminate our 
relianceonanimalsinscientificresearch. SD D A SA DK 
All forms of nature have a right to be 
left undisturbed by humans. SD D A SA DK 
Nature can compensate for any harm 
thathumanactivitiesxnightawtok SD D A SA' DK 
I would greatly lower my standard of 
living if it would ensure nature is not 
harmed. SD D A SA DK 
. .. . 
Please rate how much you trust NASA to accomplish each of the 
following by circling one response per item. 
~ucceSsfulIy complete a Mars sample 
return mission NT ST MT HT DK 
Protect Mars from contamination by 
Earth organisms NT ST MT HT DK 
Protect Earth from contamination by 
Mars organisms NT ST MT HT DK 
Respect public values and opinions 
about the risks and benefits of space 
exploration NT ST MT HT DK 
Honestly inform the public about 
risksfromplanetarycontamination NT ST MT HT DK 
77aank you for yourparticipation! 
Age: 
Sex: 0 M 0 F 
Ocdupation: 
Comtq of residence: 0 US (zip code): 
othercmdiicate): - 
If you are affiliated with any environmental groups (e.g., Greenpeace, 
the Sierra Club), please list them here. 
. .  
(Please fold here and above so that return address shows, tape securely, and return via first-class mail.) ----------------------- _------------------- 
c- 
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first class^ 
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DECISION RESEARCH 
PLANETARY MPLORATlON SURVEY 
1201 OAK S i  
EUGENE OR 97401 
he JulylAugust 1994 special issue of ne 
Planetary Report c o d  the topic of plane- T tary proteaion. a matter that muit be con- 
fronted as space scientists and engineers plan new 
missions to Mars and other planets in our solar 
system. We asked Society members to s b  their 
views on many aspects of the topic by completing 
a survey questionnaire included in that issue. 
More than 4300 Society members from coun- 
hies around the world responded. That so many 
of you were willing to share your opinions with us 
was both gmtitjring and exciting. As we promised 
hm’s a breakdown of members‘ responses to the 
survey. 
Value of Space Exploration and 
Scientlflc Research 
Thc vast majority ( 0 5 % )  fclt that spacc cxplontion 
is csscntial to the futurc of our socicry. and most 
(85%) said they werc familiar with NASA’s plans 
to conduct missions to the surface of Mars. Not 
surprisingly. the majority saw space exploration 
as having high benefits in terms of scientific 
knowledge and human fulfillment: fewer people 
saw high benefits in economic and military areas 
(see Figure I) .  
other large-scale scientific research and held 
highly positive views about the benefits of the 
superconducting supercollider. mapping the humyl 
genome and continuing the search for exhaterres- 
mal intelligence (see Figure 21. 
In general. Society members stronely supported 
Potential far Ufe on ather Planets 
The possibility of life on other planets IS one ofthe 
most inmguing aspects of space exploration. While 
people who responded to the survey \vert either 
skeptical or uncertain that intelligent c . . a a t d a l  
life wdl be discovered within a deudc or so. most 
were confident that intelligent life does exist on oth- 
er planets in the universe. Fewer agreed that some 
form of life exists either on other planets in our solar 
system or on Mars in pamcular (see Figwt 3). 
Risks of Interplanetary 
Contamination 
The need for planetary protection arises because of 
the possibility that Earth or another planet (or both) 
could be contaminated by the exchanee of biologi- 
cal materials as the result of space missions. While .;;4 -.VI 7 l r a S r a h o p a s a n t l p l r a a , ~ ~ q m x a t t i b ~ ’ s w f a c e i h U m m x i  ‘- 1 - . _. . d s a d q u w l e s c l r ~ * P l h a v s d ~ m a l ~ l n c ~ h d p s n r u r l h r i ~  - J 
~ ~ b e f f m ~ h f a ~ ~ m ~ .  hkllnP.-a- 
’ ’ -  . ~ n d ~ ~ t s n s s b b l ~ ~ ~ m a d ~ a n i n m # n t ~ ~ J p r o r -  1 .  
? 
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. i  .- - -- - . 
0 25 50 75 100 
0 25 50 75 100 
0 25 so 75 1M) 
0 25 75 
a slight majority of rcspondcnts thought t h  
the contamination of thc miutian cnvironmcnt 
by Earth lifc is not a significant h d  an 
ovenvhclming majority indicatcd that mat&- 
ais brought to E.arth/mm Mars should be mn- 
sidered hazardous until proven othcmisc 
One article in the special issue discussala 
theory that Earth and Mars were contaminat- 
ed millions o f  years ago by meteorites from 
each other (see "Swapping Rocks. Exchange 
of Surface Material Among the Planets." by 
H. Jay Melosh). suggesting that thee may be 
no need for concern about planetary pmcaion 
today. However, most respondents dim 
that concem was unnecessary even if such 
contamination actually did OCCUT millions of 
years ago (see Figure 4). 
Despite these views about the potential 
hazard of biological materials from Mars, 
thm was a high level of support for futurr 
Mars missions. Very few respondents agreed 
that possible exposure of Earth to life from 
Mars was reason to cancel a Mars mission. 
Also. few agreed that humans on space mis- 
sions should not directly contact the surface 
of other planets. or that robotic space mis- 
sions will tell us all we need to know about 
orher planets. Likewise. very few agreed that 
we should prove that no life exists on Mars 
before sending humans there (see Figure 5). 
While planctay protcction is intcndcd to 
guard against inadvencnt introduction of lifc 
eithcr onto our plana or onto mothcr planct. 
an important goal of spacc expiontion is to 
study life elsewhen in the univme. if it c x i s  
To do so may involve taking samples of life ' 
and returning them to Earth; Few respon- 
dents agreed that life on Mars. if it exisu 
in any form, should be left there undisturbed. 
Even fewer agreed that it is morally wrong 
to bring life back to Earth from another 
planet or to introduce life from Earth onto 
another planet (see Figure 6). 
Survival and Adaptability of life 
Whether life on Mars. if it exists, would 
sunive on Earth and whether life from 
Earth would survive on Man are important 
questions in the development of measures 
for planetary protection. Of all the items in 
the survey, those relating to the swiva l  
and adaptability of life received the highest 
percentages of "don't know" responses. 
indicating a high degree of uncertainty 
about these topics. 
Among those respondents who did offer 
opinions. however. few agreed that the envi- 
ronment on Mars is too harsh to sustain any 
life from Earth. Likewise, few thought that 
life that evolved in the rich natural envimn- 
ment of Earth would not be fit enough to sur- 
vive on Mars. Conversely, life on Mars was 
viewed as more fragile if brought to Earth. - 
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A majority of the respondents giving opinions 
about the ability of martian life to survive on Earth 
a p e d  that if there is life on Mats. it m&t likely 
has adapted to that specific environment and would 
not survive on Earth. Less than half (34%) a@ 
that it has m I v e d  in such severe conditions that 
it wuld probably thrive on Earth. Ovmll, rrspon- 
dents had an asynrmCtric \IM about the Sunrival 
and adaptability of life-life from Earth was seen 
as more likely to sunrive on Mars than life from 
Mars was to slpyivc on Earth (see Figure 7). 
Rating the Risks 
The potential contamination of Earth and Mars 
as part of space missions is just one among many 
risks faced by people on Earth. To put the risks of 
...___ intrrdnnerqr cnntamkz~~.r 2 @= & 3~- . 
text. respondents were asked to rate h e  risks to' 
their counny from a number of different sources. 
The highest perceived risk was ozone layer 
depletion. followed by global warming and food . . 
contamination ( from-pesticides and bacteria). Bio- ,'.. -' 
logical contamination from Mars missions was 
nted as the lowest risk along with asteroids and ' ' , 
satellite debris (see Figure 8). This does not mean: '. 
however. that these risks are of little or no concern 
to poplc. Indeed. at les t  half of the respondents 
indicated some level of risk for all of the items 
they ntcd. including thosc that ranked lowest. 
. 
Trust In NASA 
In gcncnl. respondents had ;I high level of trust 
in NASA lo successfully carry out a Mars samplc 
return mission and to protect both Earrh and M ~ K  
from interplanetary contyination. However. re- 
spondents were solmwhatks trusting in NASA to 
respect public values and opiniorSS about the,risks 
and benefits of spacqexploration ond to honestly 
inform the public abauf planetary,exploration nsks. 
Though the percentage of respondents indicating 
"modentc" or -high" trust was over 50% for all 
items. the skepticism often voiced about the trust- 
worthiness of government was echoed in these 
results as well (Figure 9). 
I 
, 
To Sum Up 
Overall. survey respondents were very optimistic 
about space exploration but cautious about the 
potential hazards of planetary contamination. As 
plans for future Mars missions move forward, 
public attitudes about managing the risks of space 
exploration will play an important role in the for- 
mulation of space policy. Your responses to this 
survey arc a key to thc dcvclopmcnt of a successful 
rclationship bctwccn thc public and organizations 
likc NASA. Thank you for your contributions. 
Dmtlrl AIucGrqvr und Puul Sltnic are senior re- 
.seurc./i u.wwiutcs of Dccisioii Rwwrch in Eugene. 
Orcpti. Both ure p.ywho1ogi.vt.v tt*ltn .rpeciuli=e in 
fhc .stit& c?/l"thlic attittides uhi~rt cchnologicai 
hmrdr. 
i - - - -  
e 
Mv. +e Res. Vol. IS. No. 3, pp. (3)285-(3)292,1995 
R i n d  in Great Britain. An rightr reserved. 
0273-1177M 57.00 + 0.00 
Copyright e 1994 COSPAR 
SOCIETAL ISSUES AS MARS MISSION 
IMPEDIMENTS: PLANETARY 
PROTECTION AND CONTAMINATION 
CONCERNS 
M. S .  Race 
College of Natural Resources, University of Cali,fomia, Berkeley, CA 94720, 
U.S.A. 
Societal and non-scientific factors represent potentially significant impediments for future Mars 
missions, especially in areas involving planetary protection. This paper analyzes public concerns 
about forward contamination to Mars and back contamination to Earth, evaluates major areas 
where lack of information may lead to uncontrollable impacts on future missions, and concludes 
that NASA should adopt a strategy that actively plans both the generation and subsequent 
management of planetary protection information to ensure that key audiences obtain needed 
information in a timely manner. Delay or avoidance in dealing with societal issues early in 
mission planning will increase the likelihood of public opposition, cost increases and missed 
launch windows. While this analysis of social and non-scientific considerations focuses on 
future Mars missions, the findings are also relevant for RTG launches, nuclear propulsion and 
other NASA activities perceived to have health, safety or environmental implications. 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout its history, NASA has been concerned about planetary protection, the prevention of 
harmful cross-contamination of planets and other solar system bodies during space exploration. 
In practical terms, this concern focuses on two primary issues: forward contamination, the 
introduction onto a planetary body of terrestrial microbes carried on outbound spacecraft or 
equipment; and back contamination, the introduction onto Earth of conramination or life forms 
carried in return soils or samples. In the face of its proposed series of missions to Mars /l/, and 
in light of continuing scientific interest in the possible existence of life on Mars, NASA has 
recognized the need to intensify its focus on planetary protection associated with both mission 
planning and implementation. As noted by De Vincenzi and Klein /2/, a variety of technical, legal 
and political issues and public concerns must be evaluated before an official set of planetary 
protection requirements can be established for Mars missions, particularly for those with sample 
return. This summarizes an analysis of forward and back contamination concerns from both 
technical and public perspectives, evaluates the extent to which societal and non-scientific factors 
might represent potentially significant immments for future Mars missions, and identifies key 
areas related to planetary protection that need further attention. 
BACKGROUND 
Concern for planetary protection is required by the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which indicates 
that exploration and studies of outer space including the moon and other celestial bodies be done 
"so as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the 
Earth resulting from introduction of extraterrestrial matter."/3/ Over the years, views about 
planetary protection requirements have evolved as new scientific and technical i n f o d o n  has 
been obtained from planetary research and exploration. These updated views have beem reflected 
internationally in revisions of COSPAR planetary protection policies and within NASA by a 
series of Management Instructions and Policy Directives /4/. As discussed by De Vincenzi and 
Stabekis /5/,  in the early 80's revised contamination control procedures were proposed that de- 
emphasized a quantitative probabilistic approach and introduced the concept of "target-planet" and 
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"mission type" categories. These categories, still in use, are incorporated in NASA's current 
planetary protection policy (NMI 8020.7C, December 12,1991) /6/. 
In anticipation of future proposed Mars missions during the next two decades, NASA has 
sponsored a series of workshops /7,8,9,10/ that have intensified discussion about both forward 
and back contamination controls. These discussions have resulted in 1) reviews of the state of 
knowledge about Mars ambient conditions and implications for planetary protection and the 
search for life on Mars; 2) analysis of past experiences and c m n t  views about forward and back 
contamination requirements and practices; and 3) preliminary considerations of social and non- 
Scientific factors relevant to planetary protection and mission success. 
and Current Views 
In considering forward contamination controls NASA has been able to build upon past planetary 
protection experiences from its earlier space programs. Valuable experience with forward 
contamination control was acquired in both the Mariner and Viking programs. Mariner flyby and 
orbiter missions, designed to meet the 1964 COSPAR planetary protection guidelines, were 
planned with cleanroom assembly of the spacecraft and careful trajectory selection to avoid 
forward contamination by premature impact on Mars /7/. The Viking program was NASA's first 
experience with landers under the COSPAR guidelines. Elaborate procedures involving 
cleanroom assembly, "sterilization" of landers, minimum periapsis altitudes for spacecraft, and 
additional heat treatment of biology instruments were undertaken. Post-Viking analyses have 
validated the effectiveness of contamination Controls and their probable indirect conmbution to the 
missions' success because of component reliability /10 (Appendix E) and 1 l/. 
Current discussions about forward contamination control are centered mainly around the 
extremely low probability of growth of terresaial organisms in the harsh martian environment and 
the question of whether Viking-like controls would be unnecessarily smngent and costly on 
future outbound missions /9/. At NASA's request, the Space Science Board of the National 
Academy of Sciences recently conducted a special review of planetary protection policy and 
practices and offered recommendations for upcoming Mars missions focusing particularly on 
forward contamination /lo/. The Board's recommendations are based on the unanimous 
conclusion that forward contamination is not a si&icant hazard to the martian environment but 
could be a problem for future in situ experiments specifically designed to search for evidence of 
extant or fossil martian microorganisms. Their recommendations, which are made with reference 
to Viking control levels and procedures, distinguish between missions with and without life 
detection experiments and instrumentation. 
on Control -- ExDenences md Current Views 
As reviewed by Bagby /1Y, the Apollo Program was the first and only time NASA has dealt with 
back contamination concerns and sample quarantine for actual missions. Concern about planetary 
protection was expressed during the planning of Apollo missions and discussed in a special 
advisory conference by the National Academy of Sciences in July 1964. An Interagency 
Committee on Back Contamination was established in 1967 to advise NASA on procedures 
necessary to protect the Earth's biosphere from potential lunar contaminants. Extensive 
quarantine protocols were developed, a special biomedical facility was established to quarantine 
the astronauts, and a separate Lunar Receiving Laboratory was constructed for studying lunar 
samples. Even with elaborate protocols and facilities, Apollo's back contamination control 
program faced problems of effectiveness which, according to Bagby, were of two general types: 
1) operational, such as those represented by the premature venting of a capsule or failure to 
follow established protocols; and 2) philosophical, such as flight crew resistance and conflicting 
intra-NASA authorities over planetary protection. 
Organizational and management problems of the Apollo program were analyzed in detail by 
Mahoney /13 / who noted that the development of effective programs to prevent back 
contamination requires as a first step the clarification of responsibilities for and authorities 
necessary to accomplish specified goals. Although no special workshops or conferences about 
back contamination issues of either robotic or piloted missions have been convened since the 
Apollo Program, sample return missions and back contamination have been considered in 
hypothetical and conceptual terms in many published articles /e.g.: 2,14,15/. It is generally 
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acknowledged that future discussions about back contamination controls are likely to encounter 
serious information gaps in scientific, technical, legal, institutional, organizational and other 
areas, making the formulation of back contamination controls more problematic than forward 
contamination controls. 
While Viking and Apollo experiences can provide general guidelines for many technical 
considerations about planetary protection, neither can be adopted on future Mars missions without 
considerable modification. Even when a l l  the technical questions are answtred, ncomdat ions  
about planetary protection based purely on technical considerations may eventually play a 
secondary role in developing the final strategy for contamination controls, especially for back 
contamination /7/. Social conccrns and non-scientific factors that were dormant or nonexistent at 
the time of Apollo and Viking launches are likely to complicate mission planning, and in the worst 
case could become significant mission impediments with the potential to greatly increase costs, 
contribute to intense public opposition and lead to possible missed launch windows. 
Socially driven concerns have already troubled NASA in the past. For example, both Galilee and 
Ulysses missions faced lawsuits seeking to delay or prevent the launches because of concerns 
about radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RE'S) and possible launch accidents. Forward 
contamination concerns were also raised in the Galilee lawsuit. These legal challenges occurred 
despite the fact that the missions were similar to many previous launches, included complete 
environmental impact analyses, and employed no new technologies. Future sample return 
missions could encounter even more intense scrutiny because of the public's concerns about 
possible introduction of extraterrestrial organisms onto Earth and the accompanying 
environmental, health and safety effects. 
The literature is replete with examples of scientifc and technical projects that were frustrated by 
public challenges and concerns. Retrospective reviews of controversial situations involving 
technologies as disparate as nuclear power, biotechnology, food irradiation, and toxic waste 
incineration have led to the identifkation of many underlying social and non-scientific concerns 
that can contribute to project opposition. Proposed Mars sample return missions bear striking 
similarities to the"1ce Minus" genetic engineering Controversy, an outdoor experiment in the mid- 
1980's involving the frst  intentional release of an organism created by recombinant DNA 
technology. Published reviews provide a good historical analysis of events during the 
controversy as well as a lengthy discussion of the differences between scientific and public 
perceptions of the experiment/16/. The "Ice Minus" project involved field testing of genetically 
engineered bacteria to determine their effectiveness in preventing frost damage to agricultural 
plants. Opponents delayed the experiment for nearly five years through a succession of legal 
challenges and public policy maneuvers that kept the debate in the public spotlight. They 
characterized the proposed experiment as reckless because it used a truly "exotic" organism 
which, they claimed, had the potential to cause untold environmental problems if released. The 
controversy ultimately involved federal, state and local government agencies; legislative bodies 
and the courts; public hearings and environmental impact documents; and intense media coverage. 
CHANGING EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS 
Through retrospective study of "Ice Minus" and other situations of scientific-technical decision 
making in the public realm, it is possible to idenhfy a number of non-scientific factors and social 
mnds that have become important elements in public controversies about science and technology 
during the past two decades. While found predominantly in American examples, the factors and 
trends described below have implications for all current space going nations and are important 
considerations when planning planetary protection strategies, regardless of which agency or 
country controls the launch or return vehicle. 
Future Mars missions will occur in a dramatically different external setting than those of earlier 
space exploration programs and are likely to encounter more public scrutiny and challenges. 
Conflicts within society about technological choices emphasizing hazards and risks have become 
an expected part of the public decision making realm over the past two decades /17 (Chapter 3Y. 
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Public attitudes about environment, health and safety have changed considerably since the Apollo 
program. As a generalization, society has grown more risk averse over time, with the trend 
expected to continue into the foreseeable future. These shifts in public attitudes about risks and 
technology have been matched by corresponding changes in law that have broadened the ability of 
citizens and groups to challenge public decisions. A host of new or restructured public 
institutions (e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, etc.) were 
mated during the past two decades that m charged with paying more attention to public goals 
and bringing technological decision making into the public arena. In addition, organized public 
oversight and vigilance has become institutionalized in the form of well-funded national and 
international groups that monitor government actions, lobby their political allies, conduct 
independent analyses, participate in regulatory decision processes, challenge government and 
corporate actions in court, and communicate with the public through the media. Because of the 
existence of many splinter opposition groups organized around single issues, it is often 
impossible to predict where challenges will surface or what focus they will take. 
There has also been a gradual but substantial shift in the way public decisions are made about 
r isks involving science and technology. As outlined by Fiorino /18 /, technological policy- 
making in a democratic society can be viewed in two different ways -- one dominated by technical 
considerations, the other by democratic and social values. The first decision making style, 
dominated by the experts, seeks objective standards in quantitative terms for determining the 
acceptability of risk, while the other, involving the lay public, emphasizes qualitative standards 
and value laden reactions to specific issues. In essence, current public decision making is caught 
in a perceptual shift somewhere between the traditional view of risk analysis as an expert process 
in which the lay public can occasionally intervene, and a newer view of risk analysis as a public 
political process that incorporates information and judgements from experts. Historically, NASA 
engineers and managers have been accustomed to reaching decisions through a highly technical, 
expert process with only minimal input from the public. However, decisions about planetary 
protection will undoubtedly impose a heavy load of social concerns onto mission planning, 
shifting the locus of decision making into a more public and democratic realm. 
ous Controvecrres on Mulhple J ev& 
Technical experts and the lay public often inadvertently focus on completely different questions at 
the same time with the same data. The experts typically gather information and perform risk 
analyses with the expectation of reaching an optimal or "right" decision. The public, on the other 
hand, often focuses more broadly on the societal context of the decision with the intention of 
preventing or stopping an action. Viewed another way, additional conflict is imposed because 
each group simultaneously focuses on different levels of the question. Often there are three 
typical levels or perspectives in a given controversy: 
An ideological or public policy focus dominated by philosophical questions of "should 
we do it?" and having an ethical or moral overtone (e.g., animal rights; nuclear 
opposition; food irradiation protests, etc.) 
A focus concentrating on formulation of appropriate technical policies and procedures, 
dominated by questions of "how should we do it?" and emphasizing a practical approach 
to decision making (e.g., formulation of govemment regulations; devising acceptable 
permit review processes; developing effective planetary protection controls, etc.). 
A local focus dominated by questions of "why do it here or now?" and characterked by 
the "NIMEiY" syndrome (not in my back yard), (e.g., site selection for an industrial plant, 
building and operating a quarantine facility). 
In extremely complicated situations, all three levels can be involved at once, mixing large societal 
questions and local opposition with the experts' tasks of assessing and managing the risks in a 
practical sense. This miXing of levels often results in accusations by the public that the experts 
not listening, or complaints by the experts that the public is ignorant or uninformed. 
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A growing body of literam has dealt with the subject of risk perception and responses to risks, 
highlighting differences betweem experts' probabilistic approach to assessing risk magnitude and 
the public's contextual view of risk that emphasizes subjective factors /17, 19/. Studies suggest 
that people allow certain qualitative factors to disproportionately influence their perceptions of risk 
more than technical and quantitative features. Important characteristics associated With peoples' 
judgements and concern about risk have been identified by Covello et al.t20/ and include whether 
the risk is perceived as familiar, understood, quantifiable, controllable, reversible, or dreaded. 
Other important factors affecting the public's perception of risk include institutional trust, accidtnt 
history, effects on future generations, equitable distribution of risks and benefits, and media 
attention. It is noteworthy that future Mars sample rem missions share many of the same 
qualitative features Seen in the "Ice Minus" experiment, which generated high levels of public 
c o n m  because it was perceived by the public as very risky despite the experts' assertions of low 
risk. 
POSSIBLE IMPACTS OF SOCIAL AND NON-SCIENTIFIC FACTORS 
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goal of identifying areas related to planetary protection that might be complicated by social and 
non-scientific factors. Special attention was paid to areas likely to be important to the public, 
especially adequacy of scientific knowledge, effectiveness of engineering technology and 
implementation, likelihood of media attention, adequacy of institutional and management 
mgements ,  and areas of legal ambiguity or potential challenge. As described below, there are 
likely to be far more public mncems about back contamination than forward contamination. 
All missions with one-way orbiters or landers will include planetary protection controls 
emphasizing prevention of forward contamination. Based on my analysis of the literature and 
presentations at NASA planetary protection workshops /7,8,9,10/, current concerns about 
forward contamination can be c h a r a c t e d  as centering largely around maintaining the integrity 
of scientific experiments, minimizing contamination of the martian surface, developing updated 
sterilization and control techniques, and avoiding unnecessary added costs to the mission. There 
do not appear to be any major ideological concerns, technical policy questions, local 
conuoversies, or legal issues likely to incite major public outcry or media attention over lander or 
orbiter missions. At present, for missions with only outgoing spacecraft, the greatest potential 
for public concern is likely to center around Earth-focused environmental, health and safety issues 
like those seen in the Galileo and Ulysses missions. If public opposition is aroused, it is most 
likely to surface in the form of legal challenges brought under various environmental laws, 
especially the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and its environmental impact statement 
requirements. Baning changes in laws or a dramatic shift in public attitudes about spaceflight, 
forward contamination issues alone are unlikely to generate the sustained media attention or 
intense public opposition sufficient to become impedunents to future outbound missions. 
Future Mars missions with sample return raise many problems related to back contamination and 
global effects on Earth that are not encountered on one-way orbiter or lander missions. Major 
engineering and scientific questions must be answered before the public can be reassured that 
back contamination controls are effective and adequate. Among the technical and engineering 
problems to be solved are: design of the sample return canister with effective sealing and 
preservation to maintain the sample at Mars ambient conditions; how to break the surface contact 
with Mars and accomplish sterile insertion of the sample; development of a fail-safe system for 
monitoring the sample and canister during the long return flight ; methods and equipment for 
recovering, handling and transferring the sample upon landing; design, location, construction, 
and operation of quarantine facilities; and development of appropriate equipment and bamiers for 
sample handling, testing, and storage /2/. Additional scientific information will be needed to 
answer questions about Earth-based sampling and testing, especially those related to operational 
protocols for the quarantine facilities, testing methods and experimental protocols for samples, 
development of appropriate bioassays, and curation and control of samples. 
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To overcome or avoid the inm-NASA management and organizational problems found by Bagby 
and Mahoney on the Apollo program /12,13/, special focus will be needed to develop precisely 
defined authorities and responsibilities within the agency for implementation of planetary 
protection controls. Considerable time must be also be allowed for completing the required 
environmCntal impact statements and permit pmcesses, and for constructing quaraotine facilities 
and performing the necessary testing and training for its use. Because other federal, state and 
local agencies may impose restrictions based on their respective legal mandates, interagency 
conflicts could be encountenxi. Legal challenges could become costly and time-consuming 
mission impediments based on issues such as environmental, health, or safety concerns; 
mnqxmhn and handling ngulations; agency jurisdictional questions; human quarantines for 
those Coming in contact with the samples; and international treaty obligations. Finally, the 
public's bndmcy to react strongly to perceived risks almost ensures intense media coverage and 
public SQUtiny on all aspects of the sample ntuxn mission. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
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Even though planetary protection is only a minor part of overall mission planning, i t  has the 
potential to become a significant mission impediment for sample return missions, especially if 
strategies for planemy protection are planned without serious consideration of non-scientific and 
social factors. Delay or avoidance in dealing with societal and non-scientific issues early in 
mission planning will increase the likelihood of public opposition, cost increases and missed 
launch windows. In order to minimize the prospects of disruption to future missions, NASA 
must proactively analyze and develop information in a number of key areas related to planetary 
protection, including: 
\ 
Mission Architecture: 
Analyze c m n t  proposals for both robotic and human sample rem missions to 
identify planetary protection concerns in each. 
Assess strengths and weaknesses of proposed mission architectures from legal, 
management , social or operational perspectives as they relate to planetary 
proteCtiOn. 
Legal: 
Include planetary protection and possible environmental effects of Mars 
missions "at the earliest stages of d y  and planning" as required by NEPA. 
* Undertake a survey of domestic laws and ngulations and international treaties to 
determine their applicability to sarnple return proposals. 
.advisable to coordinate and oversee the complex of laws and regulations that may 
. . . . .  . . . . . .  ,..;I .., ............. .  5 .  #. .:: * Determine whether establishment of another interagency review committee is 
apply to sample return. . . .  . .  
. .  
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Management: - Develop a Commitmat to fulfilling planetary protection obligations at the highest 
level of NASA a c b h h m i  on. 
* Re-institute a significant Planetary Protection Program within NASA with 
sufficient budget to support needed research and development well in advance of 
sample rem from Mars. 
Minimize avoidable operational problems with future sample rem missions 
through early, comprehensive implementation planning with social and non- 
scientific factors included. 
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Try to minimize philosophical opposition by educating NASA's technical and 
engineering community about the critical importance and necessity of planetary 
protection controls. 
Research and Development: 
Begin early, selective R & D related to planetary protection prior to mission 
approval, especially in areas with long lead times such as sample collection, 
transfer, handling, and quarantine, as well as priority social and non-scientific 
concerns. 
Risk Communication: 
Consider asking the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a scientific and 
technological study of the hazards involved in sample rem for dissemination to 
the public and legislaton. 
Keep the public informed and involved in planning and decision making for 
future sample rtturns h m  Mars. 
In the current public and political climate, many questions about the advisability and design of the 
Space Exploration Initiative and future Mars missions remain hotly debated /21/. If NASA is 
seriously committed to future Mars sample return missions, whether robotic or human, it is 
important to acknowledge from the start the d e p  to which social and non-scientific factors 
could further complicate missions in unpredictable ways. While this analysis about social and 
non-scientific considerations focuses on future Mars missions, the findings are also relevant for 
RTG launches, nuclear propulsion and other NASA activities perceived to have health, safely or 
environmental implications. 
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